ABSTRACT
In the preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic, Hegel introduces his project by discussing the displacement of traditional metaphysics, claiming that his logical science makes up metaphysics. This chapter argues that Hegel and Aristotle both rely on a version of the so-called stripping argument in order to raise problems for a certain conception of determinacy. Hegel criticizes the type of solution that the Categories offers in ways that point in the direction of Aristotle's later view expressed in Metaphysics. The chapter suggests that the ways Hegel and Aristotle respond to the predicament generated by the stripping argument also show parallels. The problems that Aristotle and Hegel raise for each candidate are not problems in the sense that they show certain characterizations of determinate particulars to be outright incorrect. Rather, the problems Hegel and Aristotle raise are problems with the independent intelligibility of each candidate.
