ABSTRACT
In 1907–1908, Bertrand Russell and G. F. Stout presented an objection against William James and Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, to which both James and Schiller replied. In this chapter, the author considers their transatlantic exchange. Despite James’s insistence that he and Schiller are in agreement, he shows that James is able to avoid Russell-Stout. Russell writes, According to the pragmatists, to say “it is true that other people exist” means “it is useful to believe that other people exist.” The postulate relevant to the Russell-Stout objection is “other minds exist,” and Stout phrases his version of Russell-Stout in terms of that postulate. Schiller’s notion of “making” reality is much too close to locked-in-phenomenalism, and nothing Schiller says in reply to Russell-Stout establishes any important distance. Both in private and in print, James insists that “Schiller’s doctrine and mine are identical, only our expositions follow different directions”.
