This chapter argues that Bertrand Russell’s philosophical development reveals a more complex relation between him and pragmatism than is often assumed—one that is marked not only by his enduring hostility to the pragmatist theory of truth but also by his increasing receptivity to other aspects of pragmatism. It suggests that rather than serving merely as an exemplar of views that the later Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard V. O. Quine, along with pragmatists Russell may have been a positive influence on the later Wittgenstein and Quine and may, in particular, have been a conduit for pragmatist influence on their views. The chapter outlines some aspects of the Moorean Russell’s metaphysics and epistemology; his views of meaning and analysis; his view of truth. It discusses how his position is opposed to pragmatism, as articulated by William James. Russell’s post-Peano engagement with mathematical logic undermines not only his Moorean epistemology but also his Moorean conception of analysis.