This chapter focuses on the first reference to pragmatism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings, dating back to the beginning of 1930 and belonging to Manuscript 107. It offers a historical framework for a more complete understanding of what may be implicit in Wittgenstein’s remark, and presents these lines in the context of what precedes and follows them in MS 107. The chapter shows that how this reflection was embedded within a philosophical atmosphere in which the roots of different philosophical perspectives merged into each other. Both George E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, to mention two of Wittgenstein’s closest colleagues, wrote reviews and commentaries of William James’s Pragmatism as soon as it was published, and both were particularly concerned with his theory of truth. In Frank Ramsey’s view, the positive contribution of pragmatism to the issue of truth lies in Peirce’s attempt to offer an analysis of propositional reference, and this analysis is conducted in terms of actions.