Expressivism and pragmatism are closely related-isms, both suspicious of large swaths of the philosophical landscape, and both skeptical of what many philosophers take for granted. This chapter focuses on ethical expressivism: the approach to ethical theory defended by Alan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, among others, that rejects realist and representationalist accounts of ethical assertions. Pragmatists and logical empiricists shared philosophical commitments to empiricism, experimental science, and even progressive politics. The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science was created in order to solidify, publicize, and advance the program of logical empiricism. George Reisch and Thomas Uebel have documented Otto Neurath’s disagreements with Rudolf Carnap, pointing in particular to the contrast between Neurath’s generally naturalistic methodology and Carnap’s more formal and logical approach to philosophical problems. The connection with pragmatism is especially clear in C. L. Stevenson’s work. Stevenson’s emotivism emerged out of his exposure to pragmatic philosophy of the 1930s and, in particular, the work of John Dewey.