ABSTRACT
'Ordinary Language Philosophy' conjures different ideas in different imaginations, and major figures in the movement defend very different views. H. P. Grice sees Ordinary Language Philosophy as a method of conceptual analysis, and also as a base for defending common sense against skepticism. This chapter argues that two supports are needed to construct an ordinary language response to skepticism, both of which are furnished by Austin. The first support comes from Austin's semantic insight: situation semantics. The second support comes from a substantive claim about the content of the concept of knowledge – namely, Austin's condition on knowledge, to the effect that the skeptic needs to offer a concrete reason for one's to be concerned about skeptical hypotheses. The basic claim of situation semantics is that the truth or falsity of an utterance depends on its descriptive content and the situation one talks about. These together fix the proposition one's utterance expresses given the situation.
