ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author describes the first uses of postphenomenology were simply applications to anything past beginnings, roughly post-Husserlian phenomenology. Then there is a small, Australian based “postphenomenology” associated with Cornelius Castoriadis as interpreted by Suzi Adams and sometimes loosely affiliated with critical theory and the Frankfort School. Dewey, following Darwin, doubted that as does pragmatically infused postphenomenology. As postphenomenology began to be recognized as a distinct mode of science-technology studies, this enhanced role of materiality was also recognized. Postphenomenology accepts, and enhances, E. Husserl’s use of variational method. Postphenomenology, also influenced by Rortean and Deweyan pragmatism, sides with the rejection of modernity’s primacy of space. Place, as phenomenologically conceived by Edward. S. Casey, arrives later in his analysis and is more concrete, but this inverts what philosophers see as the attainment of modernity. Experientially and developmentally, “places” come first experientially and are “homey” as experienced by the young.
