ABSTRACT
In this chapter I focus upon the anatomy of collectives that are morally responsible for what happens. Who exactly are the individual moral agents that constitute collectives capable of bearing moral responsibility? I will raise in addition the parallel question concerning complicity: who exactly are the individual moral agents who are complicit in the actions of another? In some instances a group of individual moral agents can both constitute a collective responsible for an outcome and have its members be complicit in the actions of a principal actor. In other instances this will not be the case. Either the individuals that constitute a collective responsible for an outcome fail to qualify as accomplices, or the accomplices in the actions of another fail to constitute a collective responsible for an outcome. This is hardly a surprising conclusion in and of itself, but I believe that examining the differences between the anatomy of a collective and the anatomy of a group of accomplices can shed light both on the nature of collective responsibility and the nature of complicity.
