ABSTRACT
In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (hereafter DNR), there is a generally underappreciated connection between the views of his character, Philo, and those of Benedict Spinoza, as presented in the Ethics. Philo offers several explanations that compete with Cleanthes's view that the source of order in the universe is a transcendent and intelligent God. I argue that one of Philo's proposals bears a significant—albeit incomplete—resemblance to Spinoza's necessitarianism. I give a summary of Spinoza's general metaphysics and his necessitarianism. I turn to an explanation of Philo's necessitarianism as it is hidden within his “World Soul Hypothesis.” I will argue that Philo's application of the concept of the World Soul involves significant, yet underappreciated, differences from earlier proponents’ use of the concept. By this contrast, I can show that Philo's concealed necessitarianism is fairly similar to Spinoza's. In section IV, I present two objections to Philo's WSH. I conclude that, given only the resources Hume has afforded him, Philo is unable to respond to them directly and substantively; given additional resources, however, he might have a fighting chance.
