ABSTRACT
Dual process theories of reasoning have been successful in that they have stimulated a large body of research. Not surprisingly, they have also stimulated debate and controversy. Reliable evidence suggests that many of the outcomes formerly attributed to working-memory (WM) demanding Type 2 processes may, instead, be the output of automatic Type 1 processes. These finding pose a fundamental challenge to the interpretation of many reasoning phenomena that are commonly described in terms of Type 1 and Type 2 processes. In this chapter, we argue that the field needs to go back to basics and test the foundational assumptions that WM is needed to successfully execute the putative Type 2 processes, and that the putative Type 1 processes are relatively spared when WM resources are limited. Conversely, researchers who wish to make strong claims about the autonomous nature of a putative Type 1 process need to be able to demonstrate that it occurs regardless of the goals/intention of the reasoner, and that, once initiated, runs to completion, even when the reasoner has the goal to terminate it. We outline potential methodologies to investigate the properties of putative Type 1 and Type 2 processes, and discuss their benefits and limitations. We hope to provide a roadmap for addressing foundational issues for dual process theories.
