ABSTRACT
Rudolf Carnap’s conception of ontological practice is not the ‘deflationist’ view – often attributed to him – that ontological disputes are vacuous and/or inconsequential. He does not seek to dismiss arguments about the existence of various sorts of entities as ‘merely verbal’ or to endorse the eliminativist view that ontological arguments should be expunged from our repertoire. Ontological questions are neither patronized nor slated for disappearance. Carnap’s goal is rather to show that continued participation in ontological theorizing is consistent with empiricist scruples. This he does by suggesting that ontological discourse is not a descriptive, fact-stating mechanism, but rather a device that serves to express commitments to adopting certain linguistic/conceptual resources ‘linguistic frameworks.’ Thus his expressivism. Moreover, the acceptance or rejection of linguistic frameworks will be decided by “their efficiency as instruments … the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required.” Thus his pragmatism.
