ABSTRACT
Classical political scientists, attuned to the vicissitudes of crowns and courts, have, in their concept of succession, left a residue of observation and analysis that bears reexamination by modern social scientists. Some of the problems attendant on succession in a bureaucracy have received comment from Arnold Brecht and Marshall Dimock. The correlation between succession and crystallization of bureaucratic trends was striking. The existence of the conditions concurrent with succession makes bureaucratization functional to the successor. The high rate of succession in the economy has, therefore, as a further institutional condition, a market for production property. Informal organization and consensus is not, of course, disrupted solely by succession or labor turnover. Two aspects of succession deserve close study: the high rate of succession among elected or appointed departmental heads, which is institutionally conditioned by periodic elections; and the "spoils system" with its rapid "rotation in office," as the historical antecedent of American civil service.
