ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an assumption that the concept of altruism implies a social dimension in accordance with the actual notion of social preference. The assumption is supported by three stages. In the first stage, the point of view of Auguste Comte will be exposed. Comte develops the term altruism with reference to the law of solidarity, a central law in his work, which connects the notion of humanity and links individuals to the past. The use of rights in the place of duties condemns the concept of altruism as presented by Comte. In a second stage, the point of view of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer on altruism will be briefly developed. Mill and Spencer proposed a vision of "rational" altruism in opposition to Comte's Altruism. In a third stage the difference between altruism and benevolence is characterized by different authors. The chapter concludes with information on the abusive interpretation of the contemporary concept of altruism.
