ABSTRACT
Intrinsic valuations are a matter of subjective commitment, not of objective truth. To arrive at a rational decision, one does not start with the arbitrary selection of some ultimate end and then proceed to the choice of whatever means are most conducive to its realization. Intrinsic valuations in connection with rational choice do not pertain to separate goals but to total outcomes. Professor Kaplan espouses the meta-ethical theory of value cognitivism, according to which not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic value judgments have cognitive status. Accordingly, the intrinsic value judgment that the greatest happiness principle is worth implementing for its own sake would be either demonstrably true or demonstrably false. Professor Kaplan points out the unsatisfactory state of the theory of rational choice even for the purpose "of acting so as to secure the values pursued." Means-end statements can be translated without loss of meaning into cause-effect statements which can, in principle, be empirically tested.
