ABSTRACT
This chapter examines one aspect of the revolutionary process—governmental responses—in two cases: Cuba under Batista and Venezuela under Betancourt. The cases of Cuba under Batista and Venezuela under Betancourt provide a useful comparative test of these ideas. Governmental response to violence is of both theoretical and practical importance. Certainly when violence is introduced, a new form of communications and bargaining emerges on both sides. In pursuit of the objectives, insurgents attempt through violence to demonstrate that the government cannot provide public safety. The trigger of terrorism and violence of the insurgents opened the floodgates of police and military reprisals, which alienated the significant uncommitted segment of the population. This sealed the fate of the regime by tipping the scales of political mobilization in favor of the insurgents. The Communist Party became more and more disenchanted with the program of violence, which they regareded as counterproductive. The threat from the left actually increased support for the government.
