ABSTRACT
The United States' doctrine of preemptive warfare evidently alarms members of the international arms control and disarmament community. This chapter considers the problems and implications of the "new" US preemptive doctrine. It argues that the doctrine cannot continue to be credible or sustainable over the long-term. The US development of more nuclear weapons-related technologies for fighting limited nuclear wars on the battlefield, and in space, will make their use more, not less likely. During the Cold War, strategists assumed that by threatening massive retaliation, nuclear weapons could credibly prevent an enemy from attacking. British officers in charge of nuclear planning at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, in off-record comments, think that Geoffrey Hoon's style of issuing a deterrent threat was cleverer than the US declared policy because it did not incite public discord or much discussion. They most fear an inharmonious debate within NATO circles of the implications of US preemptive strategy for British and alliance nuclear policy.
