ABSTRACT
Between 1974 and 1983 the federal government spent almost $3 billion in research, development and demonstration on solar technologies. In addition, more than a billion dollars were spent on tax credits and other financial incentives. These totals, however, conceal a remarkably stormy history. Annual appropriations varied by as much as a factor of ten over the period; organizational changes occurred almost every other year; the philosophy guiding the programs was radically revised at least twice. Underlying these changes were profound differences in approach to energy research and development policy among key decision makers in the federal government: the Congress, the scientific and technical agencies, and the executive offices of two very dissimilar administrations. This paper examines four approaches to national solar energy research and development policy that characterized the principal decision makers in this era: the congressional approach, as embodied in the National Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974; the “ERDA approach,” as exemplified by the first years of the national solar energy research and development program; the Carter administration approach, characterized by the 1978 Solar Domestic Policy Review; and the Reagan administration approach, as manifested in its first two proposed Department of Energy solar budgets. I will attempt to show, for each of these approaches, how the interplay of technology, politics and ideology led to outcomes that were quite different from the expectations of the policy makers and not always consistent with the overall national interest.
