ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the rational choice or decision-making approach to criminal behavior expounded by R. Clarke and D. Cornish. It suggests that fundamental problems might limit the approach's practical value as a source for crime-control policy. The chapter argues that the similarity lies in their sharing a conception of the individual criminal as a rational, decision-making agent. One of the major concerns of criminal lawyers is to delimit the ways in which individuals may be held responsible or irresponsible for their criminal acts. The discourse of the criminal law is centered around a second conception of practical reasoning, which is marked by its abstract quality. Abstract reasoning is a view of practical reasoning that stresses its asocial and purely individual character. The actual process of reasoning is again real, but only mediatory in its effect. Criminal law discourse decontextualizes actions and intentions, abstracts them from their social context, and does so in order to attribute criminal responsibility to individuals.
