ABSTRACT
A subjective expected utility (SEU) model is employed as a heuristic device to generate hypotheses and to integrate the existing experimental evidence concerning the behavior of the source of influence. As predicted from the SEU model, strong bargainers did initiate more threats to a weak opponent than vice versa. Similarly, the closer the weak bargainer was in strength to the strong bargainer, the more influence the weaker bargainer attempted. When the bargainers were power equals, pairs with high punishment potential used fewer threats than the weaker pairs. As the size of possible retaliation increased for the equal-power pairs, SEU for influence decreased, and the number of influence attempts likewise decreased. When the source and the target are equal in power and influence attempts will increase toward liked others and take the form of promises and persuasion. Relatively powerful persons are likely to be chosen as targets of influence attempts and are also most likely to initiate such attempts themselves.
