ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the end of any negotiation. It reviews what should be the negotiator's objectives other than a safe end to the crisis? What is a good deal? What are the practical difficulties for executing any deal? The chapter advises negotiators to develop a useful relationship with the other side before suggesting that some of the terrorists' expectations are unrealistic. It do not allow for any official complicity in the hostage-takers' escape: this would be antithetical to criminal justice, likely encouraging to more hostage-taking, and unlikely to be a priority for new terrorists anyway. The chapter identifies practical difficulties, particular to new terrorist hostage-takers: the terrorists' concerns about counterintelligence, mutual distrust. It observes that new terrorists are suspicious of the ulterior motives of officials who try to make a deal. The chapter concludes that the negotiator should not make any promises or agreements that the official side cannot tangibly validate to the other side.
