ABSTRACT
The phenomenology of horizons, on Merleau-Ponty's view, undercuts the metaphysical dilemma. While Merleau-Ponty nominally agrees with Husserl that everything resides within the world, things in the world partake of the world's own ontological ambiguity. In Merleau-Ponty's view, the phenomenology of horizons shows that the only logo that pre-exists is the world itself. If M. Heidegger thus displaces Merleau-Ponty's notion of ambiguity from being itself into the structure of comportment, the understanding of being, the readers might well wonder why such a displacement does not also compromise the very idea of the determinable indeterminacy of the world-horizon. For phenomenology, determinacy and indeterminacy belong to the horizon, and the horizon is what it is only because of its teleological form as a space of meaning. Heidegger describes the aim of Being and Time as the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being.
