ABSTRACT

Like other philosophers of her era, Margaret. Cavendish tackles the vexing question of what is going on when a body moves or changes its behavior and properties as a result of the behavior of another body. Cavendish posits a materialist metaphysics according to which even thinking is wholly material. Libertarian readers of Cavendish would of course have a lot more to say to motivate the view that Cavendish holds that bodies are in possession of an ability to do otherwise. Cavendish offers an account of sense perception that squares with her larger view of the activity of bodies and the general cooperation that is exhibited in nature. An individual is always a kind of society, for Cavendish, and for the most part the elements of a society work together to maintain the cohesion of the group. The story of Cavendish on causation and cognition is indeed long and windy, but it has a central thread.