ABSTRACT
This chapter asks one important question: can good institutional design ensure mutually beneficial outcomes and avoid unwanted boomerang effects? The focus here is on groundwater. In contrast to the visibility and therefore readily socially contestable nature of large engineering works such as dams, groundwater exploitation is insidious and less amenable to either organized management or social protest. Yet, groundwater is a vital resource that makes up to 20% of the world’s supply of fresh water. In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, this groundwater resource is an important source of fresh water that is shared by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. This transboundary water basin is a politicized resource that is influenced by the geopolitical climate of this region. The Guarani Aquifer Agreement (GAA) was adopted to encourage a participatory framework that follows the main guidelines found in the United Nations Law of Transboundary Aquifers such as the principles of equitable and reasonable use as well as a duty to protect and cooperate. Since the Agreement, there is evidence of poor management due to a lack of communication from all stakeholders, including national or regional governments in the overall treatment of the aquifer. Furthermore, as the global community must deal with the challenges and consequences of climate change, these riparian states should take a more active role in the collective management of the Guarani Aquifer System (GAS). This chapter illustrates the necessity of an active participatory approach based on the shared values of integrated water resource management to prevent potential boomerang effects. Put differently, it argues in support of an institutional approach to ensuring sustainable water resources management. In the absence of such an approach, hitherto latent boomerang effects may be made manifest at a variety of levels.
This chapter begins by providing background on the laws of transboundary water that led to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement. Following this, the efficacy of the various stakeholder engagements to date are evaluated. As shown in the case of Ribeirao Preto in Brazil, a lack of cooperation in decision-making has allowed high levels of industrial-discharge‒related water pollution to negatively impact a wide variety of stakeholders – from urban to agricultural. Lastly, several strategies are discussed, such as a coordinated domestic legal framework to regulate the management of the aquifer, a list of procedures for conflict prevention and resolution as well as possibilities for integrated water governance in a transboundary basin.
