ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the nature of boards in developing and emerging economies (DEMs) in line with their unique characteristics. The study was motivated by the application of traditional classification of corporate governance (CG) in literature which has being widely extended to DEMs without considering their unique peculiarities. This explains why CG practices have been failing in many DEMs with huge corporate scandals arising. The chapter examines the nature and peculiar characteristics of boards in many DEMs with focus on the BRICS and MINTS countries. In many of these countries, the nature of business ownership is either family-owned (FOBs) or state- owned (SOEs), thereby encouraging dominant ownership. This is unlike many developed markets, where private or outsider entrepreneurs dominate. In the chapter, contemporary roles of boards in many DEMs are examined, especially risk and strategy equilibrium—boards are expected to formulate strategies to help mitigate, if not eliminate risk. Our findings reveal that the dominant shareholder model ubiquitous in many DEMs can be rectified by making many of their organizations go public. In an environment in which ownership and management have become widely separated, the owners are unable to exercise dominant control over the management or the board.
