ABSTRACT
This chapter presents and evaluates the Platonic account of thought experiments that is currently most prominently advocated by James Robert Brown. A thought experiment is an experiment of a very special kind. Just by considering a particular hypothetical case in our mind we come to believe that a certain target category applies (or does not apply) to the case, or that something specific would happen if the case became reality. First, it locates Brown's position within a general taxonomy of thought experiments. Second, it gives an outline of Brown's own view and elucidates the main concepts involved in it. Third, Brown's two main arguments for epistemological Platonism will be critically discussed. Fourth, it explores Brown's Platonic account of the laws of nature. Major problems and possible advancements will be explored. Fifth, it discusses general objections to the Platonic epistemology. Finally, it considers the viability of Platonism if it is restricted to philosophical thought experiments.
