ABSTRACT
This chapter reconstructs Dietrich von Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject. Hildebrand, in fact, rarely uses the term “emotion” for the phenomena at the center of his work on affectivity. This is, at least in part, in order to distance himself from metaethical emotivists about value judgments who are seen as misconceiving these phenomena by assuming that what they call “emotions” is a non-intentional type of experience. The chapter outlines basic account of affective position-taking by specifying how Hildebrand distinguishes them from other types of position-taking. Hildebrand recognizes three basic classes of position-takings—intellectual, volitional and affective—each of which possesses its distinctive marks. In characterizing affective responses, Hildebrand’s main focus is on specifying how they differ from volitional responses, which are likewise responsive to importance.
