ABSTRACT
Gilbert Ryle viewed skill as a form of knowledge-how, which he sharply distinguished from knowledge-that. I begin by presenting Ryle’s arguments for this distinction, emphasizing the categorial difference between them. This difference is reflected in the different ways in which knowledge-how and knowledge-that are acquired. I show that as Ryle conceives knowledge-how, skill is the paradigm of this form of knowledge, and depends on a critical capacity for self-regulation and continual improvement. It is acquired through practice and “experimental learning.” I explain Ryle’s distinction between habits and intelligent powers, and the related distinction between drill, which produces routine and stereotyped behavior, and training, which aims at readying the student to become an innovator who is their own teacher and coach. I show that, for Ryle, knowledge-how includes intellectual and perceptual skills, which are needed to produce knowledge-that; and that skilled behavior also depends on knowledge-that, especially since critical reflection on one’s successes and failures requires an awareness of what one is doing and what its results are. I illustrate these points with examples drawn from Ryle’s own experience both as a teacher of philosophy, and as a trainer of infantry soldiers in anti-aircraft fire during the Second World War. I conclude with some reflections on the nature of philosophical skill and Ryle’s approach to the teaching of philosophy.
