ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the question: what does it mean to represent a task under a practical mode of presentation? The chief challenge for proponents of intellectualism about knowing how and skill is to spell out in clear and independently motivated terms what it means to represent something practically. This chapter discusses recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to argue that any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of practical representation developed here. Section 18.1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of presentation. Section 18.2 illustrates practical representation by discussing models of motor control in current theories of sensori-motor psychology; Section 18.3 puts forward an argument for positing practical representation. Section 18.4 goes from practical non-conceptual representations to practical conceptual representations—to practical concepts. Section 18.5 concludes.
