ABSTRACT
Justice as a personal virtue is here defined as a character trait falling at the Aristotelian mean between the extremes of arrogance and servility, and essentially concerns the possession of proper self-respect and engaging respectfully with others. The relations of justice as moral virtue to its status as an epistemic virtue are discussed. Central to the skills of justice are acting in accordance with the idea that “like cases should be treated alike”. This is to be taken quite broadly, so that whenever we judge concepts to correctly apply to cases there is a sense in which our judgments are “just”. Kant’s theory of judgment, as discussed in the First Critique and which works in a similar way, is elucidating on this point. Rawls’ claim that “justice is the elimination of arbitrary difference” is also discussed under this guise, especially as it relates to bias and prejudice. Further jurisprudential rules are discussed, in light of discussion by Ronald Dworkin. And finally, the role of skills to the nature of epistemic justification is used to deflate the familiar distinction in epistemology between internalism and externalism.
