ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I wish to argue that behaving virtuously requires having a set of skills that are separate from what is required for making moral judgments. In order to motivate the need to discuss virtuous behavior in terms of skills, I will rely on recent discussions of skill in the philosophical literature. The first section of this chapter will focus on arguments partly motivated by some fleshed-out examples that serve to show that having an appropriate judgment is neither necessary nor sufficient for behaving virtuously. This suggests that we need to think of a new way of behaving virtuously that is distinct from making moral judgments, so I will put forth the alternative of thinking of virtuous behavior in terms of skills. In the second section, I examine some contemporary accounts of skill as well as how they can be related to virtue. I will illustrate my preferred account with the case of musical performance and show how it can also be applied to virtuous action. Just as the best music critic need not be the best musician, the best moral philosopher (or anyone who is good at making moral judgments) may not be the most virtuous agent.
