ABSTRACT
Although pragmatism is a form of naturalism and German idealism is traditionally seen as a form of non-naturalism, both are forms of normativism, that is, both involve commitments to a conception of rational normativity that is indispensable to a sense of ourselves as rational agents; and one that is not reducible to the objective causal categories recognized by scientific naturalism—essentially those that constitute the scientific image of the world often, though not always, identified with posits of the successful natural sciences. A major difficulty confronting the normativist of either persuasion is the ancient sceptical problem known as Agrippa’s trilemma, perhaps the most powerful general argument in the Pyrrhonian sceptical arsenal. The trilemma is generated by reflecting on how people might attempt to avoid the infinite regress of justifications for justifications for any given judgment. The matter of responsibility for one’s beliefs or claims to know cannot be so evaded by switching to a naturalistic account of belief formation and stability.
