ABSTRACT
This chapter illustrates the importance of information technology and effective organizing in contemporary ballistic missile defence (BMD) debates. Beginning with an historical perspective on scientists and missile defences, it moves on to the events leading up to Bill Clinton's 2000 decision, the role played by scientists in the debate, and ends with lessons relevant for future BMD debates. Few experts believe that President Clinton pursued his national missile defence (NMD) plan by his own choice. His limited program, which even if functional would only have been capable of intercepting a few dozen warheads from an accidental launch or rogue state attack, was more the result of political pressure from the Republican Party. The decades-old BMD debate in the US may seem repetitive. But the organizational tactics of civil society groups to oppose BMD have evolved into a very different game today than in earlier cycles, such as the one that led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.
