ABSTRACT
Union-nominated members of company boards of directors (UNDs) in the United States are products of collective bargaining rather than being required by law. Though their number is small, their experiences have been studied sufficiently to draw some limited generalisations which may be of interest to scholars from other countries. This chapter draws on studies of Hammer, Currall and Stern which is based on a careful analysis by a participant-observer of who said what in the board meetings of a majority worker-owned company. A legal doctrine imposes on unions a 'duty of fair representation'. Unions have a fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of their members. UNDs were reluctant to bring up grievances themselves, and when others brought up matters subject to collective bargaining they argued these matters should be resolved through the normal grievance procedure rather than decided unilaterally by the board. UNDs typically held more board seats in majority-owned firms than in firms with less employee ownership.
