ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author explores the question of whether agent-causation has distinctive resources for responding to the Frankfurt-type cases in which it is alleged that an agent is morally responsible although he lacks alternative possibilities. The author's main focus is Timothy O’Connor’s provocative defense of incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility based on his agent-causal approach to freedom and moral responsibility. O’Connor presents various criticisms of the doctrine of semi-compatibilism: the thesis that even though causal determinism evidently rules out alternative possibilities, it does not rule out moral responsibility. The author presents O’Connor’s criticisms of semi-compatibilism and offers a reply. His special interest in articulating the way in which Frankfurt-type cases challenge the notion that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. The author argues that O’Connor’s criticism does not address the most powerful way in which Frankfurt-type cases challenge the alternative-possibilities requirement.
