ABSTRACT
A philosophical problem is that to which one is always returning, a burning in the mind that refuses to be quenched, an attractor in one's cognitive meanderings- until one day it is replaced by another. Both Wilfrid Sellars and Quentin Meillassoux are haunted by the problem of rationalism and naturalism. Sellars, much like Meillassoux, aspires to vindicate a version of scientific realism through a close reading of Kant. The subsequent reception of Meillassoux's critique of correlation has led to a welcome resurgence of metaphysical realism within continental philosophy. Several philosophers have objected that Meillassoux's speculative realism ultimately caches out as a mathematical realism that cannot do justice to the insight about the truth of ancestral statements and other statements of scientific discovery. In order to maintain the relative truth of strong correlationism in light of its absolute necessity, Meillassoux finds that he must reject the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
