ABSTRACT
C. I. Lewis’s conception of the given element in perceptual experience was one of the targets of Sellars’s famous charge that many such conceptions fall victim to the Myth of the Given. Yet, exactly what makes a conception of the given mythical has remained unclear. Here I aim to clarify this issue by discussing Eric Watkins’s recent claim that a conception exactly like Lewis’s in fact avoids the Myth. Watkins motivates this claim in part by raising objections for John McDowell’s account of the Myth and argues that a better account can be extracted from Kant. I defend McDowell’s position (and reject Watkins’s Kantian account) by arguing that these objections are based on a failure to appreciate an implication of the claim (which Watkins accepts) that rational thought operates in “the logical space of reasons.” Specifically, I focus on the implication that a thinker must be in a position to understand the rational significance of her perceptual experience. Along the way, I explain in what ways Watkins’s conception of the given in experience mirrors the view put forth by Lewis in Mind and the World Order.
