ABSTRACT
This chapter examines cooperation among nations in peacetime, crisis management, and armed conflict. He argues that the post-Cold War era witnessed a shift from a doctrine based on low-level attack to one focused on the medium-altitude, which laid bare shortfalls in European air power. In various multinational operations, the United States provided air power assets that European air forces lacked or did not have in sufficient numbers. The author suggests that despite new initiatives and cooperative frameworks, Europe’s dependence on US force enablers is likely to persist. Although the UK has emphasised interoperability with the United States, France has striven for strategic independence in intelligence and decision-making. Because of Germany’s policy of self-imposed restraint, the German Air Force has so far not translated its full spectrum of capabilities into operational output. While smaller NATO air forces have contributed to multinational operations out of proportion to their size, the delta between the US and other NATO members remains considerable. Force specialisation among European nations has often been presented as the solution, but the results have been proven unsatisfactory. The chapter concludes that the air power’s versatility – using aircraft in multiple roles – must become the underlying approach if European nations want to make tangible contributions to future multinational operations.
