ABSTRACT
The holy grail of moral philosophy must surely be an argument that would show how and why certain facts, when properly appreciated by people, no matter who those people are or what their antecedent inclinations might happen to be, rationally require of those people a certain kind of response. This chapter aims to spell out the resentment argument, to provide an evaluation of it, and to clarify the main premise of the resentment argument. The crucial observation to make about a main premise of the resentment argument is that, being about a harm done in circumstances in which a harm might not have been done, it is a premise that falls fairly and squarely on the 'is' side of the 'is-ought' gap. This premise is about a non-evaluative matter of fact. Acceptance of it does not entail acceptance of the Tightness or wrongness of what was done, and nor does it fix a subject's orientation to what was done either.
