ABSTRACT

This chapter explains the ways to develop a conceptual role view of meaning in metaethics. It suggests that there's a way to combine inspiration from noncognitivism with a particular form of the conceptual role view to form a noncognitivist view with distinctive advantages over other noncognitivist views. The chapter also suggests that there's also a way to combine a strong commitment to cognitivism with a different form of the conceptual role view to form a version of cognitivism with distinctive advantages over other cognitivist views. It argues that another way to think of the conceptual role view in metaethics is as opening up the space for a third way, beyond cognitivism and noncognitivism. The chapter provides brief comments on some relevant distinctions about what determines conceptual roles and what kind of internal connection between ethical thought and action there may be. It considers these distinctions to explain the different applications of the conceptual role view.