ABSTRACT
This chapter explores some of the approaches to solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem. It argues that each approach answers to distinctive motivations and faces distinctive problems. In many of the cases considered in the literature, there seems to be a common structure that separates fittingness from non-fittingness reasons, which appropriately motivates material approaches. But proponents of material approaches seem to overlook other kinds of cases—like that of feeling guilt in response to one's causal involvement in harm from an unavoidable accident—where the reasons need not conform to this structure. Constitutivist approaches seem applicable to both cases that animate the material approach and many of the cases it ignores. But there are concerns about whether Fitting Attitude (FA)-analysts can explain the idea of the relevant attitudes' constitutive aims without incurring vicious circularity. But the features of judgments about fittingness reasons adduced by existing formal approaches do not seem sufficient to distinguish them from all judgments about non-fittingness reasons.
