ABSTRACT
This chapter considers some natural initial thoughts about the epistemic significance of moral disagreement, eventually working up to a rough statement of the Core Argument. It gives a precise statement of the Core Argument, clearly defining the kind of moral disagreement at issue. The chapter assesses its various components, drawing heavily on the epistemology literature on 'peer disagreement'. It considers what the Core Argument's conclusion has to say about cases of radical moral disagreement. The epistemology literature on so-called 'peer disagreement' tends to focus on cases in which someone knows that there is someone else who, despite being in a certain sense their 'epistemic equal', nonetheless disagrees with them on some particular issue. Epistemic permissivists maintain that for some bodies of information, there is no unique appropriate doxastic attitude to form on the basis of that body of information; it is, rather, appropriate to form any one of a set of permissible attitudes.
