ABSTRACT

Over forty years ago, Simon Blackburn introduced the philosophical world to a figure he called the "quasi-realist". According to Blackburn, the quasi-realist is someone who "starting from an antirealist position finds himself progressively able to mimic the thoughts and practices supposedly definitive of realism". In the intervening years, other philosophers- most notably, Allan Gibbard- have joined Blackburn in developing the quasi-realist research program in metaethics, defending it from objections and arguing that it exhibits considerable promise. These efforts at developing and defending quasi-realism have garnered considerable attention from sympathizers and critics alike. Still, the view has remained elusive: it proves extraordinarily difficult to formulate an accurate and informative statement of what quasi-realism is. It is no accident that quasi-realism defies ready characterization. This chapter looks at what its proponents say when characterizing the view reveals two ambiguities that explain not just why the position is so difficult to characterize but also to assess.