ABSTRACT
This chapter explores how to understand metaethical quietism. It distinguishes several attitudes towards canonical metaethical questions that might be regarded as quietist. The chapter discusses some prominent motivations for quietism, before turning to some recent objections to these views. It concludes by saying a bit about the relationship between these issues and more general questions of philosophical methodology. Closely related ideas can be found in expressivist or pragmatist motivations for quietism. One central commitment of expressivist or pragmatist views about moral practice is the idea that the best theoretical understanding of moral judgments construes them as something other than representational beliefs, as emotions, practical commitments, or the like. Quietist views are often rejected simply because they seem to be "first and foremost expressions of impatience". This charge is surely fair against some forms of quietism. But many arguments for quietism are less "impatient" or "lazy" than they might at first seem.
