ABSTRACT

This chapter examines the East Indies crisis (typically dated from 1945–1949) as an example of ‘clientelism’, which is developed here as a new strategy of post-war state power. Themes of interdependence, legalism and moralism dominate the literature on post-World War II Dutch foreign policy, leaving the realities of Dutch power under-addressed and under-theorized. While the post-war Netherlands may have been deprived of conventional forms of state power, it did seek to leverage American power in the pursuit of its interests, in this case the retention of its traditional Indonesian colony. Post-war American power offered itself as a new international force in these years, one which Dutch authorities eagerly sought to expropriate in their struggle with Indonesian nationalism. That the effort in this case failed by 1948 is less important than the fact that the broader clientelist strategy became a cornerstone not only of post-war Dutch foreign policy, but of many other states as well. The clientelist perspective credits Dutch foreign policy with much more agency and influence than is apparent in the current literature. Furthermore, it casts the post-war international system in a much more dynamic light than is typically captured in notions of hegemonic domination and resistance. In ensuing decades, the Netherlands drew on the power of the American imperium in the form of Marshall Aid and NATO support. As this chapter shows, however, the Dutch were no mere passive recipients of that power. Rather, clientelism allowed (and allows) small powers to mould and shape the international system in their own right.