ABSTRACT
Wittgenstein did write some remarks about the arts, plausibly taken as contributions to aesthetics; and the author's comments draw on one such. But Wittgenstein also used remarks about art for other purposes – for example, to elucidate some point about meaning or understanding. Humans are creatures that, suitably trained, can react in these ways both to music and to the gestures, and so on of others. Since Wittgenstein was typically interested in the connection to understanding, he focuses either on listening with understanding or playing with understanding. There are some inferences to be drawn here from his general account of the role of interpretation in action. An obvious objection to this way of treating understanding music seems conceded by Wittgenstein's emphasis on manifesting understanding. The impact of certain distinctively Wittgensteinian ideas on an account of critical understanding needs to be accommodated: for its presumptions differentiate this account from those more usually given.
