ABSTRACT
The origin and the principal use of the Greek word martys, ʻwitnessʼ, is found in the law-court, or at least in business with legal implications (such as ʻwitnessing ʼa will or a contract). This is easily said, but it is important not to project modern legal conceptions on to institutions of the ancient world. One significant difference is that for Greeks, Romans and Jews, physical or circumstantial evidence played a much smaller part in legal proceedings than it does today. The question was not so much ʻDoes this witnessʼs account square with all the facts we know? ʼas ʻCan we rely on this witnessʼs word and is he the sort of man we can trust?ʼ. Various factors might complicate this question. In a Greek or Roman court a witness might resort to rhetorical skills to persuade the judge, and this would have to be allowed for. In Jewish procedure the witness might also be involved in both the arrest and the prosecution of the defendant. True, his testimony would be subject to the scrutiny of the court.1 But the paramount question was always whether the witnesses were persons of known2 credibility. Were they of a reputation and a standing which would command respect? As a last resort, in default of such a witness, the defendant could swear an oath – ʻcall God to witnessʼ. This settled the matter: God was a ʻwitness ʼwhom the court could hardly challenge; if the oath-taker was not telling the truth he ran the risk of a heavy punishment from God. This reliance on the personal credibility of witnesses for the effective functioning of the legal system explains the high social and moral esteem awarded to people who commanded respect for their testimony. Citizens who would be fair and truthful witnesses were highly valued. A false witness in a Jewish court would be liable to severe punishment – the equivalent of that which the defendant would have received if found guilty (Deut. 19:16-21); one proved unreliable could not testify again. A deceitful witness was also subject to moral censure: ʻA truthful witness saves lives, but one who utters lies is a betrayer ʼ(Prov. 14:25). This also helps to explain the primary metaphorical use of the word as ʻwitnessʼ, not to an objective fact, but to an opinion or a philosophy of life. The Stoic philosopher
Epictetus described the man whose character was formed to practise Stoic or Cynic virtues even when under conditions of extreme poverty, misfortune or persecution as a ʻwitness ʼto his philosophy:3 it was a man of observable character – self-sufficient, unaffected by physical adversity and so forth – whose ʻwitness ʼ to the viability of Stoicism or Cynicism could be most trusted.
