ABSTRACT
The collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and their subsequent gradual transition towards market economics and political pluralism, has created a new insecurity in both parts of the European continent. The familiar landmarks of the Cold War have been replaced by new problems: ethnic unrest; mass migration; high unemployment; and political volatility. Multilateral organizations and agreements, rooted in, and rationalized by, a bipolar world now ¿ nd themselves challenged by the search for a new raison d’être and the prospect of another EU enlargement. Against this background of shifting political signposts, the concept of a pan-European identity has acquired a new urgency and a new relevance. The politics of exclusion which once emphasized the distinctiveness of the European Union (EU) is now being replaced by the politics of inclusion whereby boundaries are being transformed into bridgeheads across which a À ow of people, goods, capital and ideas is blurring the differences between the two parts of Europe. Will it be possible to create a new European political identity that transcends the old east-west divide? Will it be possible to merge concepts of liberal democracy that have hitherto been largely monopolized by western Europe with the political experiences, equally valid, of the former Soviet satellites? At a time when the European continent is coming to terms with the dissolution of its ideological divisions, it seems appropriate, if not highly desirable, to explore the political dimensions of European identity. The EU acts inevitably as a catalyst for the formation of a European political identity both among its own member states and, by different methods, in eastern Europe. The EU is being forced to reÀ ect not simply on its institutional response to a À ood of new members but also to ponder deeply the ‘core’ values that lie at the heart of its own existence. Basic political concepts like ‘sovereignty’ ‘state’ and ‘citizen’ are being debated in eastern and western Europe. Coming from very different directions and with no certainty of similar outcomes, debates on the ef¿ cacy and legitimacy of political institutions in both parts of Europe are being driven along by the need
to tackle effectively the social effects of economic failure. So, beneath the search for more responsive institutional procedures to accommodate a more heterogeneous group of member states, the EU is simultaneously engaged in a more profound discourse at the deeper level of political values. This debate, unlike the one surrounding the reform of the EU institutions, actively engages the attention of east Europeans. Their own immediate political inheritance has taught them that there is no ‘quick ¿ x’ for either political stability or economic prosperity; and even their discourse focuses on the same issues of sovereignty and society that preoccupy citizens in the EU – albeit for different reasons. In eastern Europe, democratic institutions remain fragile. The ‘pull’ of the EU as an attractive vehicle for the journey towards economic and political consolidation may be illusory in two senses: membership may not be the magic medicine that is often imagined and, secondly, membership may, in any case, be long delayed. Any discussion of political identity in a European context also needs to take account of the security dimension. The concept of ‘European security’ has obviously undergone fundamental change since the end of the Cold War and now needs to transcend the traditional emphasis on the purely military aspects. The concept of ‘societal security’ (Waever, 1996:102-32) goes beyond the restricted military focus and considers economic, demographic and cultural factors as well as matters of human rights. The withdrawal of the Soviet military presence from eastern Europe left behind a vacuum whose consequences are dif¿ cult to predict. However, the way in which the vacuum is ¿ lled is directly linked to the matter of a common political identity since the civic duty to defend one’s own society presupposes a shared sense of identity. The notion of a ‘pluralistic security community’ seems appropriate here. Karl Deutsch (1957) characterized such a community as a group of contiguous countries that are suf¿ ciently interdependent not to fear attack from one another and therefore able to abandon all defensive preparations with respect to each other. Such a concept is relevant in Europe today at a time when the former opponents of, and justi¿ cation for, NATO are now associated with it in the Partnership for Peace agreement as part of a new emergent European security architecture. The zone of mutual trust in Europe has been steadily extended since 1989 and although this zone may not be exactly coterminous with the emergence of a common European political identity, there is an underlying dynamic that links the two, and makes them mutually reinforcing. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU is an attempt to respond to the collapse of bipolarity in Europe; and as the CFSP extends its umbrella to embrace new member states in eastern Europe, two questions will need to be answered: against what sort of aggression is a European security
policy intended to respond; and will the EU be prepared to defend one of its members against such an aggression? The roles of the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ are also crucial components of an emerging European identity; and here we may detect differences of emphasis between east and west. In the member states of the EU political identity can be expressed through state structures that take their national and ethnic composition largely for granted. Well-established democratic processes, well lubricated mechanisms for allocating scarce resources among salient groups in society, all contribute to a civic harmony on which the state builds and through which its legitimacy is consolidated. In eastern Europe on the other hand in the wake of authoritarian state structures there is a new revival of citizen attachment to ethnic and nationalist loyalties which results in state structures being challenged; and their legitimacy being called into question. The discourse in eastern and western Europe is equally preoccupied with the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ but the sources of concern are almost diametrically opposed, and the conclusions reached inevitably different.
