ABSTRACT
Skepticism was a philosophical movement of considerable significance in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.1 A major revival of interest in classical skepticism occurred in early modern Europe, and significantly influenced the development of modern philosophy by the standing challenge it posed to all of those who cherished substantive philosophical ambitions.2 Kierkegaard, as I shall try to show in this article, drew quite significantly on the strategies of ancient skepticism in his critique of what he saw as the metaphysical hubris of contemporary Hegelianism. However, the ancient skeptics-and, arguably, such early modern disciples of theirs as Montaigne-used the destruction of claims to “objective” knowledge as the basis for an attitude of tranquil indifference to ultimate questions. For Kierkegaard, by contrast, skeptical epistemology has the effect of throwing the individual back, firstly on his or her own anxious subjectivity, but ultimately-ideally-on an attitude of trust grounded in love.
