ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with a critique of Max Black's solution. It argues that the absurd conclusions of the sorites paradox can be avoided without resort to a system of many-valued logic or some other non-classical system. In the sorites paradox application of principles of classical logic to propositions containing a vague term leads to absurd conclusions. Some, like the logician J. A. Goguen, see it as a successful challenge to certain principles of classical logic; for others, like Max Black in 'Reasoning with Loose Concepts', the challenge is interesting but unsuccessful. For still others, notably Quine, the idea that reasoning with vague terms could create a problem for, say, the classical true-false dichotomy is too obviously mistaken to be interesting. The chapter considers the true proposition 'Every man shorter than some short man is short'. It might be objected that once a demarcation among borderline cases is made the reformed conception of short is not loose in the relevant sense.
