ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that, very probably, none of the ordinary 'middle-sized' objects of the 'given' world exist. It outlines two theories of reference, the second a modification of the first. The chapter shows how the second theory of reference entails the conclusion that most 'ordinary' common-sense beliefs are true; that common sense is for most part correct and that what appears to conflict with it either doesn't actually or is false. It discusses the basic form of the resemblance theory of reference does not provide a rejoinder to skepticism or to metaphysical revisionism. The chapter describes the Quine-Davidson version of Quine-Davidson and British Resemblance theory, and argues that Wittgensteinian and 'ordinary language' philosophers presuppose virtually the same principles about how language connects referentially to the world. A more easily generalizable sorites argument, due to Peter Unger, is the composition/decomposition sorites. Alternative logics seem to have been the most frequent response by people who take sorites arguments at all seriously.
